



Australian Government

EIAT

Electoral Integrity
Assurance Taskforce

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Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce

TERMS OF REFERENCE

16 October 2024

Overview

1. Public confidence in the integrity of an electoral event is essential to the real or perceived legitimacy of election results.
2. Aspects of the electoral environment are considered in various ways by policy, operational, law enforcement and intelligence agencies from across government. These agencies undertake this work as part of their existing legislated remits.
3. The purpose of the Electoral Integrity Assurance Taskforce (the Taskforce) is to provide consolidated and coordinated information and advice to the Australian Electoral Commissioner on matters that may compromise the real or perceived integrity of a federal electoral event, which includes elections, by-elections and referendums.
4. The Taskforce also provides advice to state and territory electoral commissions to support the integrity of state and territory electoral events, upon the request of the relevant state or territory electoral commissioner.
5. References to electoral integrity relate to the assistance provided by Taskforce agencies that help give assurance to the Australian Electoral Commissioner that an electoral event is unaffected by interference.
6. The Taskforce is not involved in the delivery of the election and does not have any role in other elements of electoral integrity such as electoral processes, policies, procedures or administrative or regulatory decisions.
7. Interference is characterised as any action intended to affect or disrupt electoral processes or outcomes.
8. The Taskforce comprises representatives from a number of agencies across government. Each represented agency has capabilities and expertise relevant to the assessment and remediation of threats to the integrity of Australia's electoral systems and processes. These threats may be realised through various vectors, including a cyber-or physical security incident, foreign interference and/or the spread of mis/disinformation.
9. For the purposes of the Taskforce, interference is characterised as an action intended to affect or disrupt electoral processes or outcomes which, in the case of foreign actors is deceptive, clandestine or coercive, or in the case of domestic actors, is illegal.
10. The Taskforce is responsible for assessing and understanding the vulnerability of Australia's federal electoral environment, and developing strategies and processes to ensure cohesive and effective management of risks to, and matters or incidents impacting electoral integrity.
11. The Taskforce provides a platform for information sharing and is a valuable resource for centralising and exchanging information in the lead up to, and during, an election period.

12. The Taskforce continues to meet through non-election periods to share relevant information and prepare for upcoming electoral events.

Roles and Responsibilities

13. The Taskforce is governed by a Board (the Board). The Board is responsive to the Australian Electoral Commissioner, who is responsible for delivering an election that has the confidence of the Australian people.
14. The primary responsibilities of Taskforce members are:
- Under individual agency's authorities, and in a coordinated manner, to collect, evaluate and disseminate information, to other Taskforce members on matters which may impact electoral integrity.
 - Refer any relevant, emerging or current threats or activities identified through agency activities to Taskforce members to identify any levers for response.
 - Assess and, where appropriate, respond to referrals received from other government agencies relating to the upholding of the integrity of a federal electoral event.
 - Brief other Taskforce members and the Board regarding any relevant current or emerging threats or activities relating to interference, which may impact electoral integrity.
 - Make operational-level decisions and conduct activities to mitigate and respond to current and emerging threats to the integrity of electoral events.
 - Conduct activities to proactively strengthen the security and integrity of electoral events, including providing advice and support to state and territory electoral commissions upon request.
 - Develop and maintain an accessible and effective network of agency contacts that can be used in the lead-up to and during federal electoral events, for the dissemination of relevant information.
15. The primary responsibilities of EIAT Board members are:
- To provide oversight, decision-making and strategic direction for the operational-level Taskforce.
 - To provide updates, advice and expertise relating to the electoral integrity environment, where relevant to their agency's role and remit, and facilitate Board discussion and collaboration for the upholding of electoral integrity.
 - To assist the Australian Electoral Commissioner, as appropriate, in coordinating and providing advice to government, the public and/or other entities where cyber or physical threats, or acts of interference or disinformation are discovered during (and

relating to) federal electoral events. This may include, but is not limited to briefing material, referrals and communication strategies.

16. The Electoral Integrity Intelligence Forum (EIIF) coordinates across the National Intelligence Community to provide intelligence support to electoral integrity efforts, as required. The EIIF reports to the Board.
17. The EIAT Secretariat is responsible for:
 - circulating the agenda and meeting papers a minimum of one week prior to Board meetings and three days prior to Taskforce meetings
 - recording decisions and action items
 - ensuring the minutes of the meetings are recorded and circulated to members within two weeks of the meeting.

Members

18. The following agencies are members of the Taskforce:
 - Australian Electoral Commission,
 - Australian Federal Police,
 - Australian Security Intelligence Organisation,
 - Australian Signals Directorate,
 - AUSTRAC,
 - Department of Home Affairs,
 - Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts, and
 - Office of National Intelligence.
19. The Taskforce is Chaired by a representative from the Australian Electoral Commission.
20. Each portfolio should nominate Board member-endorsed representative/s from relevant agencies. If that representative is unavailable to attend a Taskforce meeting, a proxy, also Board member-endorsed, should attend in their place. It is acknowledged that there may be different representatives required depending on the issues being considered.
21. To streamline and focus discussion, members of the Taskforce may refer issues to agencies that are not represented on the Taskforce for discussion and report back.

Governance

22. The Taskforce is governed by a Board, chaired by the Australian Electoral Commission. This chairing arrangement allows for appropriate leadership, recognising the Australian Electoral Commission's responsibility to deliver federal electoral events as an independent statutory authority.
23. Each portfolio should nominate Board member/s from relevant agencies with the appropriate knowledge and authority to contribute, acknowledging that there may be different representatives required depending on the issues being considered.
24. The Board may invite other agencies to join the Board and the Taskforce for particular matters or periods or if needed on a permanent basis.
25. Membership of the Board is listed at [Attachment A](#).
26. The Board requires a decision-making quorum of at least 50 percent of members, inclusive of the Chair.

Reporting

27. The AEC provides a conduit for information between the Board and the Taskforce, including formal reports on development of the Taskforce work program for information, feedback and endorsement.
28. The Taskforce provides a classified lessons learned document to the Board following federal elections and referendums.

Attachment A

Membership of the Board comprises the:

- Deputy Commissioner, Australian Electoral Commission (Chair);
- Deputy Secretary, Integrity and International Group, Attorney-General's Department;
- Deputy Commissioner, National Security, Australian Federal Police;
- Deputy Director-General, Intelligence Service Delivery, Australian Security Intelligence Organisation;
- Assistant-Director-General, National Partnerships, Australian Signals Directorate;
- Deputy CEO Intelligence, AUSTRAC;
- Deputy Secretary, Governance and Resource Management, Department of Finance;
- First Assistant Secretary, Governance and Grants Division, Department of Finance;
- First Assistant Secretary, Regulatory and Legal Policy Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade;
- The National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator, Home Affairs;

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- First Assistant Secretary, Digital Platforms, Safety and Classification, Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications and the Arts;
- First Assistant Director-General, Analytical Capabilities, Office of National Intelligence;
- Assistant Secretary, Domestic Security Branch, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet; and
- Assistant Secretary, Parliamentary and Government, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.